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Abstract
Hájek has recently presented the following paradox. You are certain
that a cable guy will visit you tomorrow between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m.
but you have no further information about when. And you agree to
a bet on whether he will come in the morning interval (8, 12] or in
the afternoon interval (12, 4). At first, you have no reason to prefer
one possibility rather than the other. But you soon realise that there
will definitely be a future time at which you will (rationally) assign
higher probability to an afternoon arrival than a morning one, due
to time elapsing. You are also sure there may not be a future time at
which you will (rationally) assign a higher probability to a morning
arrival than an afternoon one. It would therefore appear that you
ought to bet on an afternoon arrival.
The paradox is based on the apparent incompatibility of the prin-
ciple of expected utility and principles of diachronic rationality
which are prima facie plausible. Hájek concludes that the latter are
false, but doesn’t provide a clear diagnosis as to why. We endeav-
our to further our understanding of the paradox by providing such a
diagnosis.
1. The Cable Guy Paradox and Hájek’s Attempted Solution
Hájek (2005) presents the following paradox. You are certain that a cable
guy will visit you tomorrow between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. but you have no
further information about when. Nevertheless, you agree to a bet on whether
he will come in the morning interval (8, 12] or in the afternoon interval (12,
4); you will win a given sum if you are correct, and lose the same sum if
you are wrong. At first you have no reason to prefer one possibility rather
than the other, so assign each an equal probability. (More specifically, you
opt for a uniform probability distribution, over the 8 a.m.–4 p.m. period,
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for the cable guy’s arrival time.1 You also assume that an arrival at noon
on the dot is impossible.) But then you realise that there will certainly be
a future time at which you will (rationally) assign higher probability to an
afternoon arrival than a morning one, because some time will elapse in the
morning interval before the cable guy arrives. You also realise there may not
be a future time when you will assign higher probability to a morning arrival
than an afternoon one.
The paradox consists in the incompatibility of the following two, prima
facie plausible, principles of rationality:
Maximise Expected Utility (MEU): you should act so as to maximise
your expected utility, if you can. In the event that there is more than
one action which maximises expected utility, each is equally as ac-
ceptable.
Avoid Certain Frustration2 (ACF): when you have a choice between
two options, you should not choose one of these rather than the other
if you are certain that you will subsequently (rationally) wish you
had selected the other one, unless this is true of both options.
The expected utility of a bet on MORNING is equal to the expected utility
of a bet on AFTERNOON, initially, because the (subjective) probability of
MORNING is equal to that of AFTERNOON and the stake will — you are
sure — be the same no matter which option you choose. (It is assumed
that the only relevant factor, in so far as utility is concerned, is money.)
According to MEU, it is rationally permissible to bet either way.
However, you are certain that you will rationally wish you’d bet differently
tomorrow if you bet on MORNING, but also that you may never rationally
wish you’d bet differently if you bet on AFTERNOON. This is because (you
recognise that) some time must elapse in the morning interval, before the
cable guy arrives, even if it is only a tiny amount. It’s worth making it
explicit at this point, as Hájek does not, that you expect such a change in
preference because you are sure that you have adopted a Bayesian strategy
1 It is not assumed that you are compelled to opt for such a distribution, on pain of irra-
tionality, as objective Bayesians such as Jaynes (2003) and Williamson (2005) might suggest.
2 Hájek (2005, p. 116) also discusses a related principle, namely Avoid Self-Undermining
Choices (ASU): ‘Suppose you now have a choice between two options. You should not make
a self-undermining choice if you can avoid doing so.’ Since Hájek’s discussion focuses on
ACF, however, we also prefer to do so. We do not believe, and Hájek does not suggest, that
considering ASU rather than ACF generates a fundamentally different paradox.
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for updating, and will follow it through.3 (Else, how could you be sure how
— or even that — your assignment will change before the cable guy arrives?)
According to ACF, you are therefore in a situation where you should bet on
AFTERNOON rather than MORNING.
Note that talk of ‘wishes’ is potentially misleading, because it might be
impossible to make any conscious change due to practical (or psychologi-
cal) constraints. The cable guy might arrive just a picosecond after eight, for
instance! Yet the point remains that as far as you’re concerned, the expected
utility of a bet on AFTERNOON will, for (a rational) you at some future
point, be greater than the expected utility of a bet on MORNING. (We can
add that you’re sure that if you were to adopt a Bayesian strategy for updat-
ing, then you would assign a higher probability to an AFTERNOON arrival
than a MORNING arrival at some point.) So you’re sure that if you were
asked which way you wanted to bet at that point, then you’d have to bet on
AFTERNOON in order to obey MEU.
Hájek (2005, p. 118) concludes that ACF is false, but offers only the sug-
gestion that this is because you cannot, in the cable guy scenario, ‘specify
appropriately the [future rational] self. . . at issue’. That is to say, you can-
not be sure at which particular point(s) — e.g. 9:15 a.m. or 8:00:01 a.m.
— you will be in a scenario where you will prefer a bet on AFTERNOON.
Hájek’s reasoning is only correct, however, because if you were certain you
could identify such a future self then you would also be certain (if rational)
that you could identify a time period after eight during which the cable guy
would not arrive. To be sure that you’ll be ‘frustrated’ at 8:30 a.m. if you
bet on MORNING, for example, is also to be sure that the cable guy will not
arrive until after 8:30 a.m. That is, on the assumption that you are certain
that you’ll discover that the cable guy arrives as soon as he does.4
Since this is equivalent to becoming certain before you bet that the cable
guy won’t arrive until after 8:30 a.m. — even for reasons not relating to a
consideration of future rational selves, e.g. due to testimony from a trusted
friend — we think that Hájek’s brief diagnosis of the problem with ACF is
incomplete at best.5 In what follows, we shall propose a different diagnosis.
3 Note that you need only be convinced that you will update in such a way. Note also
that you might be convinced you will update in an Objective Bayesian manner, rather than
by Bayesian conditionalisation. See Williamson (Forthcoming).
4 Let p be ‘I will know that the cable guy has arrived as soon as he does, and thereafter’,
q be ‘I will not know at time t that the cable guy has arrived’, and r be ‘The cable guy will
not arrive before t’. It is clear that r is entailed by p and q.
5 Note that Hájek (2005, p. 118) also admits ‘[T]his much of a paradox still remains: It
is rational for you to choose the morning interval, knowing full well that there will be some
future self of yours, very much like you now but better informed, who will wish you hadn’t.’
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We will proceed by considering some variations on the original cable guy
scenario.
2. Three Illuminating Examples
In the original cable guy scenario, which we will henceforth refer to as (A),
you expect to know the outcome as soon as the cable guy arrives; the time of
discovery (TD) will be identical to the time of arrival (TA). But what if this
isn’t the case? Consider the following variation on (A):
(B) You will not be at home tomorrow — but will leave keys to your
abode with your neighbour — so will not discover the cable guy’s
arrival time until later. Here’s how. At 7:30 a.m. on the day after
tomorrow, on your return, your neighbour will hand you an alarm
clock which will sound precisely 24 hours after the cable guy’s ar-
rival. You are sure about all this today. Hence, you are certain that
you will later rationally wish to have chosen differently if you bet
on MORNING but not certain that you will later rationally wish to
have chosen differently if you bet on AFTERNOON.
We contend that (B) is like (A) in all relevant respects. Because we are
only dealing with subjective probabilities, it shouldn’t matter whether you
are sure you will prefer one option rather than the other before the cable guy
arrives rather than after. All that matters is that you are sure, and that you
aren’t sure that you will later prefer the other option. In a nutshell, whether
TD=TA is irrelevant for diachronic rationality.
This result is not terribly surprising. But now let us look at another varia-
tion on (A), which is much more interesting:
(C) The circumstances are the same as in (B) except that the alarm
clock will run backwards. It will start at 4 p.m. and run towards
8 a.m., sounding when it shows the time that the cable guy arrived
the day before. You are sure about all this today. You are there-
fore certain that you will rationally think you should have chosen
differently on the day after tomorrow if you bet on AFTERNOON,
but not certain that you will ever rationally think you should have
chosen differently if you bet on MORNING!
In (B) you expect the evidence to be presented — as in (A) — according
to the direction of time; that what happens at earlier times will be presented
at earlier times, and so on. In (C), however, you expect the evidence to be
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presented ‘backwards’; that what happened at earlier times will be presented
at later times, and vice versa. Now according to ACF, you should bet on
AFTERNOON in (A) and (B) but on MORNING in (C). So your conviction
about the order in which the evidence will be presented is crucial.
Our intuition, however, is that your conviction about the order in which
the evidence will be presented should not have an effect on whether you bet
on MORNING rather than AFTERNOON. Consider now the following:
(D) You find yourself in a cable guy scenario where the bet will be
made by your friend, against you. After he has made his bet, how-
ever, you will then be free to choose in which order the evidence
will be presented.6
In (D), should you choose to have the evidence presented ‘forwards’ (e.g.
as in (B)) if your friend bets on MORNING, but ‘backwards’ (e.g. as in
(C)) if he bets on AFTERNOON? Do you really think that doing this would
improve your chances of winning? We guess (and hope) not. You can force
him into a situation where he will face certain frustration (and you will avoid
it) if you want to, but how will this prevent him from winning (and therefore
prevent you from losing)?
If you now share our intuition, perhaps you will also agree with the fol-
lowing rough articulation of why it seems right: the order in which the ev-
idence is presented can’t possibly have any effect on, or even indicate the
truth about, when the cable guy will actually arrive. So (D) forms the basis
for an argument that the order of the evidence should not generally matter,
and derivatively an argument against ACF. In what follows we will try to
flesh this out.
3. The Problem with Avoid Certain Frustration
Above, we have seen that (one’s conviction about) the order in which the
evidence will be presented, in the cable guy scenario, is crucial in determin-
ing how one should act according to ACF. Now we want to explain precisely
why the order shouldn’t be a consideration in determining rational action.
Consider scenario (A), i.e. the original cable guy scenario, again:
• Let those possible worlds in which MORNING is true be called M-
worlds.
6 We can add that your friend is sure that you will choose the order, so need not consider
ACF himself, if desired.
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• Let those possible worlds in which AFTERNOON is true be called
A-worlds.
• Now consider only those worlds in which you bet on MORNING.
• In M-worlds, the change of mind will be ‘in vain’ (IV), because
MORNING is true.
• In A-worlds, the change of mind will not be ‘in vain’ (∼IV), because
MORNING is false.
Your subjective probability that you will have a future rational change of
mind is unity. Your subjective probability that said change of mind will be
IV is equal to your subjective probability that it will be ∼IV, and you recog-
nise that these options are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. So P(Rational
Change of Mind will be IV)=P(Rational Change of Mind will be ∼IV)=0.5.
As far as you’re concerned, how you will rationally change your mind (in
this instance) does not indicate whether MORNING is true or false.
To be sure, you are not certain that you will have any future rational change
of mind if you bet on AFTERNOON; to this extent, there is a clear asym-
metry between a bet on MORNING and a bet on AFTERNOON. However,
this does not help if what matters is whether your change of mind will be IV
or ∼IV.7 And if all you are interested in is winning the bet, rather than ‘the
disutility of the pain of regretting your choice’ (Hájek 2005, p. 114), then
surely you should only be interested in whether or not your change of mind
will be IV. It is easy to see why. It will be IV if and only if MORNING is
true, and ∼IV if and only if MORNING is false!8
In support, consider also the following case where you are sure that your
Bayesian updating will be interrupted. You are certain today that AFTER-
NOON is false. However, you are also certain that by tomorrow morning you
will have forgotten this crucial fact (through no fault of your own), and will
also fail to realise that you have forgotten such a fact. You are thus certain
that you will have a rational difference of opinion the next morning if you
bet on MORNING, and that you may not have such a difference of opinion
if you bet on AFTERNOON, but you are also certain that this will be IV. It is
clear, therefore, that your expected future rational change in mind should not
matter. It should not matter simply because it is believed in advance, with
certainty, to be IV.9
7 Note that if you have no idea whether the change of mind will be IV or ∼IV, you have
no reason to prevent it either. It could be a good thing, and it could be a bad thing.
8 There is thus an asymmetry between what matters for the application of MEU and for
the application of ACF.
9 It is easy to see that this will be also be a concern even if the future rational change in
mind is held only to be highly likely to be IV.
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This example is imperfect, because it is possible to suggest that it is cru-
cial, for the paradox to retain its force, for you to be sure that your future
self will be updating on the basis of new evidence with the same background
information. (There is also a considerable literature on the Sleeping Beauty
problem, where forgetting is central; see, e.g., Hitchcock 2004 and Bradley
& Leitgeb 2006.10 We do not want to run roughshod over this.) In short, the
apparent force of ACF in the cable guy scenario may derive from a consid-
eration such as ‘favour the rational self with the greater amount of relevant
information’. Yet it remains the case that there need not, in any given case, be
a link between obtaining more relevant information and making the correct
decision. In fact, there are well-known problems with weight of evidence
considerations. As Keynes (1921, p. 76) noted:
Weight cannot. . . be explained in terms of probability. An argu-
ment of high weight is not “more likely to be right” than one of
low weight. . . Nor is an argument of high weight one in which the
probable error is small.
So while it is true that you will have more relevant information after 8 a.m.,
in the original cable guy scenario, it does not follow that this will enable
you to make a ‘better’ decision in some objective sense.11 What’s more, you
might surely be able to recognise this at the time of the bet. And perhaps
this explains, in part if not in whole, why the order in which the evidence is
presented does not matter. Changing the order that the evidence is presented,
in scenario (D), is only guaranteed to allow one to avoid a change of mind.
But such a change of mind might be IV.
4. Two Further Considerations
We are not convinced that this is the whole story, however, because two
further matters may be relevant in understanding how the cable guy paradox
arises. The first is that you expect (with certainty) ‘settling evidence’ — that
is to say, to discover to your final satisfaction when the cable guy arrives
— at some stage. The second is that you do not expect to receive relevant
10 These build upon other scenarios where Dutch Book arguments are shown to be prob-
lematic. See, for instance, Hájek (2005b) and Rowbottom (2007).
11 This may be unfavourable for Bayesianism tout court, but we are not Bayesians. See,
for instance, Rowbottom (2008).
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information which will bear on the aleatory probability of the cable guy’s
arrival in the morning or afternoon. We will deal with these issues in turn.
First, compare the cable guy scenario with one where you are trying to
establish the probability that a given coin lands on heads when flipped. Ini-
tially you assume that heads and tails outcomes are equipossible, exhaustive,
mutually exclusive, and independent; P(heads)=P(tails)=0.5. Then you learn
that a future rational self will, as a result of conditionalising on the evidence
after some unspecified number of flips, believe that P(heads)=0.6. Should
you opt for P(heads)=0.6 (and P(tails)=0.4), here and now? While we are
not convinced that the answer lies in the affirmative, we think it is plausible
that it does. Only after an infinite number of flips, which you can be reason-
ably assured you will never experience, would you gain ‘settling evidence’
— would you reach a stage at which you would not anticipate any (serious)
possibility of further evidence that would make you change your mind. In
example (A), however, you are sure of receiving ‘settling evidence’ when
the cable guy arrives in your house. In examples (B), (C) and (D), this will
be when the alarm sounds.12
Second, note that the sort of evidence you expect to be presented with —
information about some period in which the cable guy doesn’t arrive — will
not, as far as you’re concerned, inform you about the aleatory probability of
MORNING and/or AFTERNOON. But if you expected to learn that he had
a higher propensity of arriving in the afternoon than in the morning, e.g. that
he would be driving and there would be a serious traffic jam in the morning,
then changing your preference here and now would seem advisable.13 It is
easy to motivate this view by considering what would happen if one were
put through such a scenario many times in a row. In the long-run, adopting
a strategy of agreeing with your future self should increase your number of
wins (and definitely will in the limit). Nothing similar is the case in the
standard cable guy paradox.
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